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WAS BIVENS NECESSARY?
Ann Woolhandler* & Michael G. Collins**
INTRODUCTION
The propriety of Bivens1 actions is part of the debate about federal com-
mon law.2  For some judges and scholars, implied actions are a particularly
reprobated form of federal common law.3  Justice Alito’s opinion for the
Court in Hernández v. Mesa treated Bivens and its progeny as “products of an
era when the Court routinely inferred ‘causes of action’” under statutes and
then “extended th[e] practice [to] the Constitution.”4  Both implied statu-
tory and constitutional actions, he stated, are in tension with the Constitu-
tion’s “separation of legislative and judicial power.”5  And he rejected
arguments that the historical availability of common-law claims against fed-
eral officers in federal courts supported Hernández’s claim, because those
cases preceded Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins’s admonition that “[t]here is no
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institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William Minor Lile Professor of Law and Armistead M. Dobie Research Professor of
Law, University of Virginia.
** Joseph M. Hartfield Professor of Law and Joseph W. Dorn Research Professor of
Law, University of Virginia.  Our thanks to Richard Fallon, John Harrison, Jonathan Nash,
Caleb Nelson, George Rutherglen, and to participants in the Notre Dame Law Review Bivens
symposium.
1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
2 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 910–11 (1986) (including both constitutional and statutory implied actions in
her discussion of federal common law).
3 See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Bivens is “a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to
create causes of action” by constitutional implication); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (1985) (criticizing both statutory
and constitutional implied actions); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legiti-
macy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 797
(1989) (particularly criticizing implied statutory actions).
4 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)).
5 Id. at 741.
1893
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federal general common law.”6  He also suggested that if Bivens were decided
today, the Court would be unlikely to reach the same result.7
The beginning premise for critiques of federal common law is that fed-
eral common lawmaking often involves policymaking discretion more prop-
erly exercised by the states or Congress.8  Were courts more constrained by
custom, precedent, and the general principles of common law, then federal
common law arguably would be of less concern.9  But because precedent is
easily malleable, it provides little constraint on courts using federal common
law to implement their own policy choices.10
Some federal common-law skeptics have provided criteria for keeping
federal common law in check.11  Although not specifically addressing Bivens
actions, Professor Nelson has argued that when engaged in federal common
lawmaking, federal courts should see themselves as more tied to custom, gen-
eral principles of the common law, and precedent, rather than seeing them-
selves as engaged in a freewheeling search for the best policy.12  This
methodology makes federal common law less subject to criticism as usurping
6 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), quoted in Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742.
7 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742–43 (noting the Court had observed that if “ ‘the Court’s
three Bivens cases [had] been . . . decided today,’ it is doubtful that we would have reached
the same result” (alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856)).
8 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Law, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 85–86 (1995) (noting judicial lawmaking is problematic for separation of powers
and democracy); see also Merrill, supra note 3, at 12–13, 24–25 (arguing that principles of
federalism and electoral accountability should constrain federal common lawmaking);
Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 24
(2015) (discussing Justice Scalia’s and others’ views).
9 Nelson, supra note 8, at 9. R
10 Scalia, supra note 8, at 82, 113 (attributing the problem in part to law school train- R
ing, which leads judges to ask what the result should be and then distinguish contrary
cases).
11 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 720 (2008) (arguing that federal common lawmaking
should be tied to sources listed under the Supremacy Clause; the constitutional structure is
created by the constitutional text and allows for some federal common-law role); Bradford
R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2001)
(arguing the sources of law listed in the Supremacy Clause are exclusive and that the limi-
tations help to preserve federalism); id. at 1423 (indicating that the Court’s once-expansive
approach to implied statutory actions “arguably allowed federal courts to evade federal
lawmaking procedures meant to safeguard federalism”).
12 Nelson, supra note 8, at 9 (arguing there is a difference between making law out of R
whole cloth and a common-law method that looks to “widespread customs, traditional prin-
ciples of common law, or the collective thrust of precedents from across the fifty states”);
cf. Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1132 (1978) (indicating that ordinary common law is thought justifia-
ble because it is confined to precedent and principled development).  Under Professor
Nelson’s view, the courts would not need to claim they were interpreting the specific lan-
guage of constitutional and statutory texts, and federal common law could also extend into
areas where state law could not operate of its own force.  Nelson, supra note 8, at 35, 42. R
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the lawmaking roles of other government actors.  Professor Merrill has
argued that federal common law needs to be specifically intended by the
framers of a constitutional or statutory provision,13 or necessary to “preserve
or effectuate some other federal policy that can be derived from the specific
intentions” of the framers of a constitutional or statutory provision.14  He
argued that Bivens was illegitimate under his criteria.15
For those with more capacious views of federal common law, Bivens is
not hard to defend.  Some such scholars argue that federal common law is
appropriate so long as the court can “point to a federal enactment, constitu-
tional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law
rule,”16 or to a federal interest, in order to justify federal common law.17
Indeed, Judge Friendly suggested that federal courts could appropriately
make federal common law in areas of federal concern where a uniform rule
was desirable,18 and suggested that tort suits against federal officers was such
an area.19  And even some jurists who criticize implied statutory actions have
argued that federal courts should be able to imply rights of action to imple-
ment the Constitution.20
13 Merrill, supra note 3, at 23–24, 47.  Professor Merrill would require that the specific R
intention be derived from “conventional textual interpretation.” Id. at 47.
14 See id.  Professor Merrill would also allow federal common law where there was a
delegation to the courts to make law. Id.  He argues that there was a delegation to engage
in substantive constitutional interpretation, and that such lawmaking need not necessarily
adhere to conventional textualist interpretation or specific intention. Id. at 62.  It might
be possible to argue for a delegation to the courts to provide adequate remedies for consti-
tutional violations, but Professor Merrill does not do so. Id. at 50 & n.213.
15 See id. at 51.  Specific intentions seem to include intentions that courts would have
some powers to confect remedies. Id. at 62 (“The pervasive influence of the common law,
broadly defined, suggests that the framers anticipated that federal courts would perform a
common law function in giving effect to the constitutional language.”).
16 See, e.g., Field, supra note 2, at 887 (“[T]he only limitation on courts’ power to R
create federal common law is that the court must point to a federal enactment, constitu-
tional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule.”).
17 See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 833 (1989) (indi-
cating it is appropriate for the federal courts to make federal common law when doing so
would advance the national interest).
18 Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405 (1964) (indicating that the development of uniform federal common law was
appropriate in areas of federal concern).
19 Id. at 412 (suggesting that both the right to relief as well as defenses might properly
be the subject of federal common law).
20 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 733 n.3 (1979) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (“And this Court’s traditional responsibility to safeguard constitutionally protected
rights, as well as the freer hand we necessarily have in the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, permits greater judicial creativity with respect to implied constitutional causes of
action.  Moreover, the implication of remedies to enforce constitutional provisions does
not interfere with the legislative process in the way that the implication of remedies from
statutes can.”); Redish, supra note 3, at 796–97 (reasoning that the Constitution was meant R
to be judicially enforceable, and the Court’s role in our constitutional system makes pro-
viding remedies appropriate); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the
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This Essay, by contrast, will address the extent to which Bivens actions
might be justified even under the more restrictive views of the federal courts’
common-law powers.  We particularly look to actions such as Bivens itself:
damages actions for a trespassory harm that cannot be justified given consti-
tutional limitations.21  Under restrictive criteria, one might ask if the framers
of the Constitution or relevant statutes contemplated the trespass action as a
vehicle for enforcement of constitutional prohibitions.22  This inquiry over-
laps with whether the remedy is supported by common-law methodology and
precedent.23  We also proceed to ask if the remedy is constitutionally neces-
sary.  This can be divided into two questions: (1) whether this trespass-type
remedy is constitutionally necessary?;24 and (2) whether the federal form of
the remedy is constitutionally necessary?25  We conclude that the Bivens deci-
sion itself may have been justified under these criteria, although other deci-
sions implying constitutional actions may not be.26
“Heady Days,” 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 513, 521 (2011) (noting the clear distinction between
providing remedies Congress did not provide to enforce statutory rights and providing
remedies for constitutional violations).
21 We are not treating the relevant category as damages actions generally. Cf. Alfred
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1159 (1969) (“There is surface appeal
in the notion that the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that every trespass
by a government officer would be a constitutional case—yet it is such a case, insofar as the
Constitution supplies the controlling behavioral standard (as well as judicial power to pre-
scribe the defenses of the federal officer).”).
22 See Merrill, supra note 3, at 23–24 (stating that “it should not be regarded as a R
usurpation for the courts to interpret the Constitution to reach results that the framers
sought to constitutionalize”).
23 See Nelson, supra note 8, at 9. But cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Consti- R
tutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 939 (2019) (“First, we should substantially jettison the
ordinary, private-law tort system as an anchor for thinking about constitutional remedies,
including damages and injunctions.”).  Some might argue that the fact that a particular
remedy was in contemplation of the Framers and that the remedy was supported by com-
mon-law methodology might be enough to support a federal common-law remedy.  This
history might also support the proposition that the Framers and Congress delegated power
to prescribe constitutional remedies. Cf. Redish, supra note 3, at 797 (assuming that the R
courts would have power to issue at least injunctions, and where necessary, damages to
enforce the Constitution). But cf. supra note 14. R
24 Again, this inquiry might suffice for some critics of federal common law. See, e.g.,
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 12, at 1136–39 (apparently treating a damages action as
inhering in the Fourth Amendment and as necessary to keep the right from being a “mere
form of words” for Bivens, without looking to other remedies).
25 See Merrill, supra note 3, at 51 (“If existing state and federal remedies are adequate R
to preserve a specifically intended federal right, then there is no justification for creating
additional federal remedies.”); id. at 57 (indicating some judgment may be required to
determine the necessity of preemptive—that is, nondelegated—lawmaking).
26 One of us, Professor Collins, is unsure whether the federal form of the remedy was
constitutionally necessary in Bivens.
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I. EXPECTATIONS, COMMON-LAW METHODOLOGY
  This Part is primarily addressed to the Framers’ expectations regarding
remedies for constitutional violations and precedent.  While this Part pro-
vides some evidence that certain remedies may have been thought necessary
to enforce the Constitution, Part II discusses the question of necessity
separately.
Certain premises enjoy widespread agreement among federal common-
law proponents and critics alike.  The Constitution is meant to apply as law.27
This entails that a federal court—when presented with a case or contro-
versy—may properly engage in constitutional interpretation to decide the
dispute before it.28  When would the federal courts have occasion to apply
the Constitution and provide such interpretation?  The constitutional text
generally does not specify remedies or create causes of action.29  The Fram-
ers’ expectation then would be that the Constitution would apply as law in
actions that otherwise came before the courts.  Those cases would include
government enforcement actions where the defendant raised a constitutional
defense, as well as common-law trespass actions in which the Constitution
would negate a defendant’s plea of legal justification.30  Trespass refers to
intentional invasions of person or property, such as arresting persons or seiz-
ing goods.  It should be noted that, like defenses to enforcement actions,
trespass actions are in a sense defensive.  They address intentional depriva-
tions of interests in liberty and property that an officer has effected, but with-
out the officer’s invoking judicial process as in enforcement actions.
If trespass actions were contemplated as a vehicle to enforce the Consti-
tution, one might also suppose that equity actions to enjoin imminent or
ongoing trespasses were in contemplation, if a court were properly exercising
equitable powers.31  Often anticipating official action, such injunctions are
also in a sense, a defensive remedy, similar to defenses to enforcement
actions and trespass suits.  Indeed, modern federal common-law skeptics
accept most injunction actions to enforce constitutional norms, while often
27 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 3, at 797 (stating that most agree that the Constitution R
was not meant to be merely advisory).
28 We put aside disputes about the proper methodologies for interpretation.
29 Cf. Fallon, supra note 23, at 941 (noting, however, the Constitution’s references to
habeas and just compensation).
30 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 935 (“Judge-made tort law that furnishes remedies for
official wrongdoing, including constitutional violations, is as old as the Constitution
itself.”); Merrill, supra note 3, at 63 (in support of his argument that the Framers delegated R
some substantive lawmaking power to the courts, indicating that defenses to enforcement
actions and trespass actions would be means to enforce the First and Fourth
Amendments).
31 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 942 (“The Framers assumed the existence of a going R
regime of common law and equitable remedies through which government officials could
be held accountable for unlawful conduct, including constitutional violations.” (citing
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779 (1991))).
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treating damages actions as questionable.32  Historically, however, trespass
actions and actions to enjoin trespasses were two sides of the same coin.33  If
the officer had committed a trespass, he could be individually liable for his
own wrongs and would not enjoy the protections of sovereign immunity.  The
availability of a trespass or other common-law action for which he could be
individually liable would also support an injunction claim against the officer
as an individual when a trespass was threatened or ongoing, or when dam-
ages were otherwise inadequate.34  Whether the action was for damages for a
past trespass or to enjoin a future or ongoing trespass, the Constitution could
negate the officer’s claimed justification of exercising valid authority.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, for example, the theoretical individ-
ual liability of Ohio Auditor Ralph Osborn in an action at law for trespass, or
32 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856, 1858 (2017) (assuming a baseline of
injunctive remedies in considering whether to imply a damages remedy); John F. Preis, In
Defense of Implied Injunction Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3
(2013) (indicating that injunctive actions, as opposed to damages actions, to enforce the
Constitution generally are not thought to require congressional authorization). But cf.
John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990–91 (2008) (treating Young as
authorizing antisuit injunctions that raised federal defenses to enforcement actions, but
not necessarily as authorizing constitutionally based actions in other circumstances); id. at
1008 (seeming to see injunctions against trespasses as appropriate equity claims).  Some
commentators treat the Court’s decision in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 1378 (2015), as undermining the presumption of injunctive relief, see Fallon, supra
note 23, at 986, but the case involved a statutory claim that a state payment schedule vio- R
lated the Medicaid law, and the Court found the statute did not contemplate the remedy.
See id. at 986–87 (stating that Armstrong was correctly decided on its facts); see also Idaho v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 931–32 (7th ed. 2015) (indicating that the parts of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion that treated Ex parte Young remedies as largely discretionary were
joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
33 See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1117, 1135 (1989) (arguing for damages actions from the proposition that injunctions
were generally available only when damages were inadequate); Preis, supra note 32, at 12 R
(indicating that English equity more or less followed the common law in enjoining tres-
passes); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 396, 419–20 (1987) (discussing the symmetry of damages and injunctive relief).
But cf. Preis, supra note 32, at 6 (arguing that equity and law were not in all cases so tightly
bound, thus indicating that injunctions as to constitutional violations should not be subject
to the limitations imposed on damages actions).
34 See, e.g., In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 191 (1893) (upholding contempt sanction against
sheriff who, in violation of a federal injunction obtained by the railroad’s receiver, did not
release railroad property that the sheriff held for nonpayment of state taxes); id. at 188 (“It
has been repeatedly and uniformly held by this court that in a proper case for equity inter-
position an injunction will lie to restrain the seizure of property in the collection of taxes
imposed in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.” (first citing Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); then citing Dodge v. Woolsey, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855); then citing Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 311 (1885);
then citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); and then citing Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591
(1891))).
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for money had and received from the Bank, supported the injunction against
him.  “[T]he appellants acknowledge that an action at law would lie against
the agent, in which full compensation ought to be made for the injury,” said
Chief Justice Marshall.35  “It being admitted,” he continued, “that the agent
is not privileged by his connexion with his principal, that he is responsible
for his own act, to the full extent of the injury, why should not the preventive
power of the Court also be applied to him?”36  Similarly, in a later case
approving an injunction against state officers’ sale of property to which the
plaintiff claimed title, the Court stated that where state officials “commit acts
of wrong and injury” to the plaintiff’s property, then a suit is available against
the individual officers “whether brought to recover money or property in the
hands of such defendants, unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the State, or
for compensation in damages, or, in a proper case where the remedy at law is
inadequate, for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury.”37
Federal court jurisdiction in Osborn was based on the Court’s interpreta-
tion of a congressional statute authorizing the Bank to sue and be sued in
“any Circuit Court of the United States.”38  But both before and after the
1875 advent of general federal question jurisdiction, the Court often upheld
such damages and injunctive remedies when diversity of citizenship was pre-
sent, and gave a capacious view of the diversity jurisdiction to accommodate
cases raising federal constitutional issues against state and local officials.39
The federal courts also regularly entertained trespass and related common-
law actions against federal officers, either as a matter of original jurisdiction,
for example under admiralty or diversity jurisdiction,40 or under provisions
for removal from state courts of suits against specific categories of federal
officers.41  Although actions for injunctions against federal officers were
35 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 843.
36 Id.; see also id. at 839 (“The appellants expressly waive the extravagant proposition,
that a void act can afford protection to the person who executes it, and admits the liability
of the defendants to the plaintiffs, to the extent of the injury sustained, in an action at
law.”).
37 Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891), paraphrased in Tyler, 149 U.S. at
190.
38 See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 817.
39 Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107
YALE L.J. 77, 84–111 (1997).
40 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 130, 137 (1851) (reviewing an
action brought in a lower federal court, holding the officer liable in trespass for seizure
from the plaintiff merchant in Mexico during the Mexican War); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 331, 331, 335 (1806) (reviewing trespass action from the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia against collector of military fines for seizure under order of an invalid
court martial); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 122–25 (1804)
(under admiralty jurisdiction, holding captain liable for a good faith seizure without prob-
able cause).
41 See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 150–51, 154 (1836) (removed
action in assumpsit to recover excess duties paid with notice to the collector of claimed
illegality).
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scarce,42 the Court on occasion entertained ejectment suits as to real prop-
erty claims,43 as well as mandamus actions that compelled action from the
federal official.44
In addition to diversity, admiralty, and removal as vehicles for lower fed-
eral courts to hear cases against federal officers, Congress had provided for
jurisdiction for actions “arising under” some specific laws prior to 1875.
While some such provisions supported lower federal court jurisdiction for
fairly explicit statutory claims, others were typically used for state-law or gen-
eral-law actions with a federal ingredient in them.45  For example, Congress
provided in 1833 “[t]hat the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United
States shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, arising under the revenue
laws of the United States, for which other provisions are not already made by
law.”46  Plaintiffs without diversity or the amount in controversy could there-
after bring assumpsit actions against federal revenue officers for taxes paid
under protest.47  Assumpsit actions were a substitute for refusing payment
and suffering a forcible seizure, which could thereafter occasion a trespass
suit.  In the federal court assumpsit suits, plaintiffs typically alleged the
demand for payment, that the demand was unjustified, and that the plaintiff
paid under protest against the legality of the demand.48  The officers’ want of
42 Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 166–67, 177 (1893) (approv-
ing injunction against Secretary of Interior’s revocation of a grant of public lands by his
predecessor).
43 Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 369–70, 382 (1867) (basis for jurisdiction
unclear; reviewing an action from a lower federal court, and rejecting on the merits the
plaintiff’s action for possession of land held by federal officer); Meigs v. M’Clung’s Lessee,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 11, 18 (1815) (affirming the lower federal court’s grant of eject-
ment against federal officers as to land on which a United States garrison was located); see
also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 197, 204, 223 (1882) (approving relief in a removed
ejectment action); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305, 308, 316, 322 (1858) (reviewing
an ejectment action removed from the state court against a federal officer, denying relief
because the Court determined that the plaintiff had junior title).
44 Mandamus compelled an officer to perform a plain official duty, often created by a
statute. See, e.g., United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 379–80, 405 (1880) (approving
mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to deliver a land patent); Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 609, 626 (1838) (compelling the Post-
master General to credit plaintiffs’ accounts as directed by Congress).  See generally Aditya
Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017)
(discussing mandamus).  Mandamus was also based on the concept that an officer might at
least theoretically be individually liable for damages. See, e.g., Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at
609, 614.  Both ejectment and mandamus were actions at law but operated similarly to
prospective injunctions.
45 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice
Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2158–59 (2009).
46 Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 2, 4 Stat. 632, 632.
47 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 45, at 2161 n.55 (citing cases).
48 Id. at 2162.  An 1864 provision largely displaced the arising under assumpsit actions
against customs collectors, but a provision in effect from 1864 to 1866 provided for cases
“arising under” internal revenue laws and the courts under that act allowed assumpsits
against such collectors. See id. at 2163–64.  Plaintiffs later used the 1875 general federal
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justification under federal law in these cases appears to have been part of the
plaintiff’s complaint.49
Overall, these developments are consistent with the supposition that the
Constitution would be enforced as law in the courts, and with the expectation
that traditional common-law trespass actions and related equity actions would
be among the actions in which the Constitution would be enforced.  They are
also consistent with common-law methodology and precedent.  For the most
part, the remedies we have focused on are “defensive”—that is, actions
addressing intentional deprivations of traditional interests in property and
person50 that an officer might effect without invoking judicial process.
We do not mean to suggest that these suits were “implied” federal consti-
tutional or statutory rights of action.  Rather they were garden-variety com-
mon-law actions that could be traced to either general or state law, and were
brought under a number of jurisdictional provisions including diversity,
admiralty, federal officer removal, and provisions for cases “arising under”
specific federal statutes.  But we suggest that the Framers’ expectations and
the precedent for the availability of these remedies provide at least some sup-
port for the Court’s later countenancing of trespass-type actions to enforce
the Constitution under federal common law and general federal question
jurisdiction.51
II. THE NECESSITY OF DAMAGES REMEDIES
In this Part we address whether some of the common-law remedies just
discussed could be viewed as constitutionally necessary.  Of course, the ordi-
nary trespass action or injunctive action that was brought in a lower federal
court would not generally have occasioned a pronouncement by the Court
that a particular type of claim was constitutionally required.  But one can, to
an extent, test the Court’s notions of constitutional necessity of damages
actions in the lower federal courts by looking at cases it heard on direct
review from the state courts.  The Court did not purport to exercise general
common-law powers in reviewing decisions from state courts, but rather was
limited to reviewing denials of federal rights in accordance with the restric-
tions in section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.52  Stated differently, on direct
question provision to support assumpsit actions against internal revenue officers. See id. at
2164 n.72; cf. Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 287, 292–93 (1852) (approving state
court jurisdiction over a trover action against a postal official on the ground that state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction of suits arising under federal law).  An 1845 act pro-
vided for jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the postal laws.  Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 43,
§ 20, 5 Stat. 732, 739.
49 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 45, at 2162.
50 Habeas corpus was available against federal officers with respect to alleged unjusti-
fied detention. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, 1195–97. R
51 Cf. Nichol, supra note 33, at 1135 (common-law methodology supports Bivens R
actions).
52 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.
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review the Court largely took state causes of action as it found them.53  When
the Court, due to constitutional concerns, nevertheless stepped in on direct
review to require state courts to entertain a certain cause of action similar to
that which the federal courts would have supplied in cases originating in the
lower federal courts, it suggests that the Court saw the cause of action as
constitutionally necessary in both contexts.54
That the Court saw some trespass-type actions as constitutionally neces-
sary is illustrated by the Virginia Coupon Cases.55  The state of Virginia, in
restructuring its debt, offered holders of certain state bonds a lesser amount
of new bonds.56  An inducement for accepting the new bonds was that the
interest coupons on them could be used to pay state taxes—thus seeming to
give bondholders a means of enforcing the state’s obligation to provide inter-
est without the difficulties of suing the state.  The state, however, later for-
bade its tax collectors from accepting the coupons, and even abrogated the
preexisting trespass action against the collectors who forcibly collected the
taxes after tender of the coupons.57
In one of those cases, Poindexter v. Greenhow, a taxpayer sued in trespass
in state court after the collector seized his property for nonpayment of taxes
after the taxpayer tendered his coupons.58  The officer defended based on
the state laws that prohibited his accepting the coupons and that also abro-
gated the trespass action against the collector.59  On direct review, the
Supreme Court treated the abrogation of the trespass action as itself a viola-
tion of the Contract Clause, such that it could ignore the repeal.60  But the
Court also indicated that in all events the state must make the trespass rem-
edy available, apart from its having been a remedy at the time of contracting:
“No one would contend that a law of a State, forbidding all redress by actions
at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the courts of the United
States, for that would be to deprive one of his property without due process
of law.”61
The Court simultaneously approved lower federal court actions for cog-
nate relief: a federal question damages action against the collector for seizing
53 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Jurisdictional Independence and Fed-
eral Supremacy, 72 FLA. L. REV. 73, 88 (2020) (indicating that the Supreme Court was reluc-
tant to find it had appellate jurisdiction when state courts denied a plaintiff relief on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction or lack of a cause of action).
54 Cf. Hill, supra note 21, at 1114, 1116 (arguing that, given that state courts must
exercise their ordinary jurisdiction to vindicate federal rights, it follows that the federal
courts must do so as well).
55 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
56 Id.
57 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 277 (1885).
58 Id. at 273–74.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 303–04.  The Court, however, had allowed the abrogation of certain other
remedies such as mandamus that existed at the time of the contract. See, e.g., Antoni v.
Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 780–782 (1883).
61 Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 303.
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property after tender of the coupons62 and a diversity action to enjoin the tax
collectors from seizing property for nonpayment of taxes after tender of the
coupons.63  In the latter action, the Court suggested that jurisdiction under
the 1875 federal question statute would also have been available.64  Given the
determination, on direct review, that the trespass action was required, all of
the actions seemed to be grounded in a sense of constitutional necessity.
There are later examples of the Court requiring, on direct review, that
state courts supply both monetary and injunctive remedies, and these were
not limited to Contract Clause cases where state-law remedies existing at the
time of contracting might be read into the contract.  The Court, for example,
required monetary remedies in state courts for the collection of taxes alleged
to violate rights vested under the Fifth Amendment,65 as well as rights under
the Equal Protection Clause66 and the Commerce Clause,67 and also
required an injunctive action to address an oil inspection fee alleged to vio-
late the Commerce Clause.68  The line of modern cases associated with Par-
ratt v. Taylor69 indicates that the Due Process Clause requires states to supply
damages remedies for certain intentional trespasses even if they do not vio-
late specific constitutional provisions.70  And as to more specific constitu-
tional prohibitions, the federal courts have often found it easier to supply
remedies themselves rather than to force unwanted causes of action on the
states.71
62 White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307, 308 (1885) (reinstating the trespass action).  The
Court rejected an action under the 1871 Civil Rights Act (now 42 U.S.C § 1983) on the
ground that Contract Clause rights were not rights “secured by the Constitution” within
the meaning of that Act.  Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 321–23 (1885), discussed in
Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section
1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1518–19 (1989).
63 Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 311–13, 317 (1885).
64 See id. at 316.
65 Ward v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 20, 24 (1920).
66 Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446–47 (1923).
67 McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
The Court frequently treated the obligation as arising from the Due Process Clause. See
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 53, at 107 & n.201.
68 Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 212, 216, 231 (1908); see also Vladeck, supra
note 20, at 522–23 (indicating that tax remedies, habeas, and injunctive actions are better R
lenses than implied statutory actions for evaluating Bivens actions).
69 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
70 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 614 (2005) (indicating that due
process protects a right to redress, particularly for intentional misconduct protecting tradi-
tional interests in property and physical liberty).  In referring to the Parratt line of cases as
requiring remedies for certain intentional torts, we do not mean to include negligence
claims such as those at issue in Parratt. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 336
(1986) (indicating that a negligently caused injury is not a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property for which the state must provide remedies).
71 See Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in
Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1968) (suggesting that it may be preferable for the
federal courts to supply a remedy rather than forcing the states to do so); Woolhandler &
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III. WAS THE PRE-BIVENS FEDERAL QUESTION ACTION STATUTORILY
AUTHORIZED AND/OR CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY?
In this Part, we examine the propriety of the Court’s countenancing of
federal question jurisdiction over what we argue are required remedies.  In
the late nineteenth century in Scott v. Donald, South Carolina merchants
brought an action in federal court against South Carolina officials for dam-
ages and an action for an injunction to stop further trespasses, claiming that
the state law that authorized the seizures violated the Commerce Clause.72
The Court held that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate in both
cases.73  The Court in Scott likely did not see itself as implying federal causes
of action but rather as entertaining state- or general-law actions with a federal
ingredient apparently included as part of the plaintiff’s complaint.74
A. The Irrelevance of “General Law” Versus “State Law” to the Necessity of the
Action.
Part III analyzes Scott v. Donald under the assumption that the underly-
ing trespass action was a state-law claim.  Justice Alito in Hernández wrote off
cases of trespass actions against federal officers that the petitioners cited as
merely reflecting the pre-Erie general common law.75  While Scott involved
cases against state and not federal officers, it sheds light on whether older
Collins, supra note 53, at 109 (“Outside of the tax and related contexts . . . the federal
courts have generally supplied constitutional remedies through their own causes of action
where remedies may be shaped to take account of . . . competing interests.”).
72 165 U.S. 58, 59, 62, 91 (1897) (damages for seizure of liquor); Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 107, 110 (1897) (injunction).
73 Scott, 165 U.S. at 72–73; Scott, 165 U.S. at 113–15.
74 See Scott, 165 U.S. at 78–80 (describing allegations that would support possible
exemplary damages so that the amount in controversy for subject-matter jurisdiction would
be enough: “After alleging that the plaintiff, in importing for his own use the articles men-
tioned, were in the exercise of his legal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, it is averred, in the several declarations, that the defendants were notified
that any seizure of said goods, under any pretence of authority, would be a grievous tres-
pass and in disregard of constitutional rights, for which they would be held responsi-
ble . . . .”); Donald v. Scott, 67 F. 854, 855 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (indicating that the plaintiff’s
bill (complaint) “avers that so much of the dispensary law as is set up in justification of
these acts of the defendants in preventing him from importing for his own use and con-
sumption alcoholic liquors, the products of other states, into this state, violates the inter-
state commerce law as established by the constitution and laws of the United States, and is
null and void”); id. at 856 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that the case did not arise
under federal law: “These questions made in the bill are federal questions.”); id. at 855
(stating that the plaintiff was a South Carolina citizen); Scott, 165 U.S. at 117 (affirming the
circuit court decision in Donald v. Scott).
75 Hernández v. Mesa,140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). But cf. Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall
Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 541 (2013) (“[T]he federal
courts’ pre-Erie approach could easily and properly have been retained and recharacter-
ized in post-Erie terms as the application of a federal common law of remedies for constitu-
tional violations.”).  The petitioners in Hernández cited a number of the cases such as those
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precedents for federal question actions raising constitutional claims against
officers reflect legitimate exercises of judicial power.  If one adopts a skepti-
cal view of general law as does Justice Alito, how much difference would it
have made to the result in Scott v. Donald?  To comply with post-Erie supposi-
tions, one would now have to assume that the underlying trespass action was
state law, not general law.  If the result would be no different under (post-
Erie) state or (pre-Erie) general law, then such trespass suits should remain
useful precedent for a federal question trespass action to enforce the Consti-
tution against federal officers.
Consider first what would have happened if the State of South Carolina
purported not to allow a trespass action against its constables in the circum-
stances of Scott.  If the action arose in state court, the Supreme Court on
direct review could require the state to maintain such a state-law trespass
action as a matter of federal constitutional law. Poindexter v. Greenhow and
later cases indicate that the state would have been required to provide the
remedy.76  The action in Scott, however, was brought in federal court, and
under federal question jurisdiction.  But even if one sees the underlying tres-
pass action as based in state law, the Court could disregard a state’s attempt
to abrogate the trespass remedy, thereby treating the state-law trespass action
as constitutionally necessary.77
* * *
That, however, would—for a federal common-law skeptic—raise the
question of how the required state-law trespass action arose under federal
law.78  In other words, a remedy such as damages or injunctions may be con-
stitutionally necessary to address certain trespassory harms.  But the remedy
need not necessarily take the form that the Court gives it—in this case
allowing the Constitution to be alleged in the complaint and allowing origi-
nal federal court jurisdiction.  And although Scott preceded the Court’s well-
pleaded complaint decision in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,79
the Court already employed such a rule by the time of Scott—and Scott
seemed to satisfy it.80
listed supra notes 40–41; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 8, 11–12, Hernández v. Mesa, R
140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 3714475, at *8, *11–12.
76 Similarly, a federal diversity court could have entertained the claim.
77 See Hill, supra note 21, at 1111 (“If . . . damages and possibly other legal remedies R
must be sought under state law, the outcome probably is not materially different from what
the outcome would be if the right were deemed to arise under the Constitution, apart from
the issue of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts.”).
78 See Merrill, supra note 3, at 51 (indicating there is no justification for new remedies R
“[i]f existing state and federal remedies are adequate”). But cf. Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 12, at 1136 (not addressing possible state-law-based remedies in finding the Bivens
remedy appropriate).
79 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
80 See id. at 154 (citing prior cases applying the well-pleaded complaint rule to cases
filed originally in federal court); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888).  The Court
would later read the 1887 revisions to the removal provisions as also requiring that the
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Perhaps this feature of pleading in Scott would be acceptable to the skep-
tic if the state itself allowed the plaintiff to plead the officer’s alleged lack of
justification in the complaint.  The Court, however, in these pre-Erie cases
made no such inquiry.  And if the state did not allow such pleading, then
arguably the Supreme Court’s allowing federal question jurisdiction would
run afoul of federalism.  And the alternative route for legitimacy—Congress’s
approving such a change—was arguably unavailable as well.  Thus, separation
of powers was also offended.
B. Statutory Authorization in the 1875 Act Apart from Constitutional Necessity?
But it seems at least possible that Congress intended the 1875 “arising
under” jurisdiction to encompass federal question actions such as those in
Scott.  As noted above, in cases against federal officers prior to 1875, “arising
under” jurisdictional provisions in early federal statutes apparently author-
ized claims of traditional common-law actions for monetary relief that
pleaded the lack of official justification in the complaint.81  Indeed, some
might go further to argue that the 1875 Act generally authorized the Court to
confect constitutionally necessary or appropriate remedies.82  If the 1875
provision for original federal question jurisdiction can properly be inter-
preted to encompass jurisdiction over the trespass action in Scott, then
neither federalism nor separation of powers is offended.83
federal question appear on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. See Tennes-
see v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 45–49; cf. Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History
of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723 & nn.32–34 (1986) (indicating that
some proponents of the 1875 jurisdictional provision believed they were extending juris-
diction to the full extent allowed by Article III and citing authority).  The Act was one of
several provisions expanding federal jurisdiction, including the provision for habeas for
persons held “in violation of the constitution.” See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat.
385, 385.  The modern habeas provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a)
(2018).  The removal provision of the 1875 Act seems also to have contemplated federal
defense removal.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 471.
82 Professor Fallon has suggested that the 1875 Act might be read in light of a more
general interpretive presumption, that
when Congress vests the federal courts with federal question jurisdiction, they
should be presumed to have common-law-making powers to recognize causes of
action that are necessary or appropriate to protect constitutional rights.  Congress
could legislate to override that presumption—but its attempted override would
then be subject to as-applied challenges in particular cases.
He notes that this presumption would help explain the general lack of objection to injunc-
tions against constitutional violations.  Email from Richard Fallon, Professor of L., Harvard
L. Sch., to authors (Dec. 19, 2020, 5:45 PM) (on file with authors).
83 This interpretation is supported by older “arising under” claims against federal
officers both before and after the 1875 Act, see supra text accompanying notes 45–49, and R
by the interpretation of the act in the Virginia Coupon Cases, as well as in injunction claims
under the federal question statute. See supra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. R
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C. Constitutional Necessity for Treating the Action as Arising Under Federal Law?
Of course a skeptic might discount the congressional intent argument,
perhaps arguing that jurisdictional provisions should not generally be read as
providing causes of action.84  But the actions in Scott were state- or general-
law actions for trespass damages and to enjoin a trespass where the lack of
justification was pleaded in the complaint.
In addition, the skeptic might argue that the Court’s countenancing a
federal question version of the state-law trespass action under the 1875 Act
itself needed to be necessary.  And such a showing of necessity could be diffi-
cult, given that lower federal court jurisdiction is rarely constitutionally
required in light of Congress’s control of such jurisdiction.85  If state courts
might already supply needed remedies, or the Supreme Court could compel
them to, perhaps any showing of absolute necessity for the federal question
action would fail.86
Scott v. Donald, however, involved both a damages claim and an injunc-
tive claim brought under the federal question statute.87  And as a general
matter, federal common-law skeptics are not apt to question the propriety of
federal question jurisdiction over actions to enjoin trespasses alleged to vio-
late the Constitution—actions in which the plaintiff pleads the lack of justifi-
cation in the complaint.  They presumably see such actions as within the
Framers’ contemplation with respect to the Constitution or the federal ques-
tion statute, or as required to implement the Constitution.88
The injunctive actions and the trespass actions, however, were merely
different versions of the same underlying protection against unjustified inva-
sions of property.  If one is as strict with injunction actions as with damages,
84 Cf. Merrill, supra note 3, at 42 (stating that a jurisdictional grant generally is not R
sufficient as a grant of delegated lawmaking power to courts); Alexander Volokh, Judicial
Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391,
1432 (2017) (same).
85 It is common to discuss duties on the federal courts to supply constitutionally neces-
sary remedies, so long as they have jurisdiction.  True, Professor Hart’s Dialogue indicates
that state courts are the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights.  Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).  But a large part of the Dialogue addresses how federal courts
should use and have used their remaining jurisdiction to resist congressional jurisdiction
stripping, with the state courts presented as a last line of defense. See generally id.; Wool-
handler & Collins, supra note 53, at 118.
86 In addition, diversity jurisdiction would have continued its historic role in providing
damages and injunctive relief in constitutional cases.
87 Cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 301 (1995) (noting that § 1331 is generally seen as adequate to support equitable
relief without other explicit congressional authorization, and that injunctions are generally
only available when remedies at law are inadequate); Nichol, supra note 33, at 1136 (argu- R
ing that damages should not be treated differently from injunctive relief with respect to the
Constitution and the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018)).
88 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 987–88 (arguing that Bivens remedies are supported by R
analogy to Ex parte Young, the exclusionary rule, and requirements that state courts enter-
tain damages remedies).
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then perhaps the Court should not have allowed a federal question injunctive
action in Scott, at least without exploring how state courts required such
actions to be pleaded—assuming we are analyzing Scott under post-Erie sup-
positions.89  The Court might also need to ask whether state injunctive reme-
dies were adequate, or whether direct review might suffice.90  In the area of
injunctive relief, however, the skeptics do not seem to require a showing of
strict necessity in the sense that the constitutional right would otherwise be “a
mere ‘form of words.’”91  Whatever their requirement of necessity consists
in, they take as a given that a federal court injunctive remedy in many circum-
stances meets it without regard to state-court remedies or pleading
requirements.
Perhaps the skeptic would urge that injunctions are somehow a more
obligatory remedy than damages.92  Both damages and injunctions, however,
may be constitutionally required remedies although perhaps not equally so
in all cases.93  Injunctions may be more time sensitive than damages actions,
thus perhaps making an original federal forum more important.  But state
89 Cf. Harrison, supra note 32, at 1010, 1015 (arguing that Ex parte Young involved a R
claim for an antisuit injunction wherein a plaintiff could allege in the complaint a defense
to an action at law).  Professor Harrison does not specify the source of the antisuit equity
action but has stated he now thinks it is federal equity.  Letter from John Harrison, Profes-
sor of L., Univ. of Va. Sch. of L., to authors (Dec. 29, 2020) (on file with authors).
90 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
400, 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (pointing out that injunction actions indicated
that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was federal); cf. In re
Tyler, 149 U.S.164, 189 (1893) (“Manifestly the object of this legislation was to confine the
remedy of the taxpayer for illegal assessment and taxation, to the payment of taxes under
protest, and bringing suit against the county treasurer for recovery back, but all this is
nothing to the purpose.  The legislature of a State cannot determine the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States, and the action of such courts in according a remedy denied to
the courts of a State does not involve a question of power.”); Hill, supra note 21, at 1140 R
(indicating that post-Erie, “if the view is taken that the right to an injunction in a case like
Ex parte Young is given not by the Constitution but by equity conceived of as an indepen-
dent substantive system, the question that inevitably arises is whether it is federal equity or
state equity.  If state equity, then a federal injunction can not issue in a case like Ex parte
Young unless the state would give it, which is obviously not the law.”).
91 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting from an opinion below
and stating that this was essentially the government’s position); Merrill, supra note 3, at 52 R
(favoring this formulation).
92 See supra text accompanying note 31.
93 For example, tax remedies in modern practice are generally by way of postexaction
monetary remedies rather than injunctions. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 53, at R
112.  So, too, inverse condemnation actions have often displaced injunctions with respect
to takings. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nine-
teenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 98–99, 133–34 (1999) (dis-
cussing displacement of injunctions by permanent damages remedies); cf. Richard S.
Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385, 1405 (1964)
(noting but disagreeing with the argument that state court actions at law against federal
officials are less intrusive than equity actions); Katz, supra note 71, at 43 (arguing that
damages and injunctive actions should be treated similarly).
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court hurdles and delays to damages relief may also significantly undermine
the necessary remedy.
Finally, one could argue that the Rules of Decision Act (“RDA”)—whose
interpretation was at issue in Erie—was particularly directed to legal, not
equitable, actions, and that one should read Erie’s interpretation of the RDA
with respect to actions at law back into cases like Scott.94  Thus, one might
argue that Congress’s grant of equity jurisdiction, including in the 1875
Act,95 delegated to the federal courts more authority to adjust equity plead-
ing requirements and remedies.96  But the above analysis looks at the equity
actions in Scott from the modern skeptic’s view.97  Under that view the fed-
eral courts generally have no more authority to deviate from state-law
defaults when the action is in law than when it is in equity.98  If a federal
question version of the equity action such as in Scott is legitimate because it is
necessary (even if not in a “mere form of words” sense), that would lend
support to the argument that a federal question damages action was neces-
sary as well.
* * *
This Essay thus far has looked at the Court’s use of damages and injunc-
tive actions as ways to enforce the Constitution in the context of trespassory
harms.  The Constitution’s strictures were meant to apply as law in cases
94 See Hill, supra note 21, at 1129 (indicating that the plaintiff’s bill in equity, because R
it had to allege the inadequacy of the remedy at law, would tell the “entire story”); Merrill,
supra note 3, at 28, 31 (relying generally on the RDA to support his views); Redish, supra R
note 3, at 766 (relying on the RDA to support his skeptical view of implied statutory R
actions).
95 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (stating “all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States”).
96 See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-
Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 253–54 (2010) (arguing that federal judges
exercised greater freedom in applying nonstate law in equity than in actions at law, includ-
ing as to procedures, remedial laws, and sometimes as to primary rights); Preis, supra note
32, at 23–24 (arguing that Congress gave federal courts more power to fashion equity R
actions).  The Court seemed to exercise a similar freedom in customizing actions to accom-
modate federal constitutional issues, whether the case was one in equity or at law. See
generally Woolhandler, supra note 39.
97 This is true even though they do not seem to question Ex parte Young style
injunctions.
98 See Merrill, supra note 3, at 29 (arguing that the fact that the RDA did not cover R
equity should not be seen as license for the federal courts to expand their powers); id.
(acknowledging that the federal courts in equity felt relatively free to draw on English rules
of decision, but also noting that the Court in Erie indicated that the default to state law
would apply even without statutory authority); id. at 29 n.128 (also relying on Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)); id. at 50 (indicating that the analysis of the propriety
of federal common law should not change whether the relief is for damages or an injunc-
tion).  The RDA moreover is not now limited to actions at law.  Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018)).
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properly before the courts, and the Framers contemplated legal enforceabil-
ity through general or state-law trespass actions.  Injunctions against immi-
nent or ongoing trespasses provided a similar remedy to damages actions,
and both types of actions could be seen as constitutionally necessary.  The
tradition of such actions was supported by a methodology that relies on pre-
cedent and common-law suppositions.
To respond to the criticism that older federal court damages actions
merely reflected pre-Erie general common law, Section III.B analyzed Scott v.
Donald in light of post-Erie assumptions by treating the underlying trespass
action as deriving from state law rather than general law.  But because the
underlying actions for trespass and to enjoin a trespass that could not be
justified given constitutional limitations were—we have argued—necessary
remedies, treating the issue as one of state law as opposed to general law
would not have changed the result in these cases; the actions would still have
been available.  The question then was whether treating the federal issue as
part of the plaintiff’s complaint, which gave lower federal court jurisdiction
apart from diversity, could be justified by congressional intent or necessity.
Viewing the constitutional issues as part of the complaint for both damages
and injunctive actions against governmental actors may have comported with
framers’ expectations for the 1875 Act.  And both types of action would meet
a constitutional necessity test that includes some practical judgment as to
whether leaving the administration of remedies to the state courts would sig-
nificantly undermine the constitutional right.
IV. GOING BEYOND TRESPASS
The above argument has relied upon the traditional link between tres-
pass and injunctive actions in cases raising constitutional questions.  This link
would be weakened as the Court allowed more injunctions that were not
addressed to imminent trespasses.  In Ex parte Young,99 for example, the
Court allowed an injunction against court-based enforcement of an unconsti-
tutional rate regulation, that the Court analogized to a trespass.100  Other
cases allowed injunctions against unconstitutional actions that would not lead
to either physical trespass or to enforcement actions against the plaintiff for
violations of the challenged law.  For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Court allowed private schools to challenge a state law that imposed penalties
on parents who did not send their children to public schools.101
99 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
100 Id. at 166–67; see Fallon, supra note 23, at 972 (seeing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 R
(1908), and General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), as marking a move “from dam-
ages to equitable remedies as the more indispensable safeguard of constitutional rights”);
Preis, supra note 32, at 32 (tracing use of equity for constitutional cases to the Lochner era). R
101 268 U.S. 510, 530–32, 536 (1925); see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35–36, 39
(1915) (allowing an injunctive action by an employee against the enforcement of a state
law that penalized employers who did not employ at least eighty percent qualified voters or
native born Americans); Ann Woolhandler, Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests, 43 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 811, 832–36 (2016) (discussing expansion of individuals’ ability to chal-
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There was, moreover, no pretense during the Lochner102 era or thereaf-
ter that every unconstitutional regulatory scheme that could occasion an
injunction could also occasion a claim for damages.103  Damages often would
have been either inadequate, or beyond the means of any individual official
defendant, particularly in cases challenging broad regulatory schemes.104
Injuries not involving direct trespasses, moreover, did not carry with them
the same pedigree as the trespass action for damages.
Although far outstripped by federal question injunctive actions, federal
question damages actions did not entirely disappear.105  Some federal ques-
tion damages actions proceeded against state and local officials under the
federal question statute,106 but § 1983 actions would eventually supersede
them.  A few federal question damages actions also proceeded against federal
officers,107 but federal officer removal provisions made the question of fed-
eral question suits against federal officers less pressing.108
lenge government action without showing invasions of traditional interests in individual
liberty or property).
102 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103 See Hill, supra note 21, at 1137 (“Thus, despite the many instances, of which Ex parte R
Young is such a conspicuous example, in which officers have been the subject of equitable
relief in connection with the administration of unconstitutional regulatory statutes, it does
not seem to have been seriously suggested that, absent malice, such officers were person-
ally liable for the damages that must often have been suffered by reason of their official
conduct.”).
104 See Collins, supra note 62, at 1530–31.
105 See, e.g., Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 611–12, 614 (1902) (allowing a federal ques-
tion assumpsit action against a federal official who enforced an unconstitutional tax); Col-
lins, supra note 62, at 1521–23, 1521 nn.157–58 (citing cases).
106 See Collins, supra note 62, at 1521–22 nn.158–59 (citing voting cases); see also Jacobs
v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1933) (in an action under the Tucker Act, indicating
that the right to just compensation arose from the Fifth Amendment and did not require
statutory authorization); Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 140 (6th Cir. 1968) (suc-
cessful § 1331 claim under the Fifth Amendment for losses from a discontinued eminent
domain proceeding); Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 389
F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (successful §1331 action under the Fifth Amendment for
inverse condemnation).
107 See, e.g., Spreckels Sugar Refin. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1904) (stating
that the suit against the internal revenue collector to recover duties paid under protest
arose under federal law); id. (“It arose under the Constitution, because the plaintiff’s cause
of action, as disclosed in its Statement of Demand, has its sanction in that instrument, if it
be true, as alleged, that the act of 1898, under which the defendant proceeded, when
collecting the taxes in question, is repugnant to the Constitution.  And it arose under the
laws of the United States because it arose under a statute providing for internal revenue.”);
Iron Gate Bank v. Brady, 184 U.S. 665, 666–67 (1902) (tort action under the federal ques-
tion statute for enforcing unconstitutional federal tax).  While these cases were prior to
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule did not originate in that case. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
108 The removal provisions became universal with the 1948 revisions.  See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), discussed in FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, at 853–54. R
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When the Supreme Court faced tort claims against federal officers in
which the plaintiff claimed original federal question jurisdiction, the results
were inconclusive. Bell v. Hood presented a traditional trespass claim where
the lack of justification due to constitutional constraints was alleged as part of
the complaint.109  The Court held that a case seeking damages for FBI
agents’ alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations should not be dis-
missed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal question stat-
ute.110  The actions, however, were dismissed on remand, for failure to state
a claim.111  Other tort actions against federal officers in which the Court indi-
cated that the actions did not arise under federal law did not present
instances of constitutionally necessary relief under traditional or current
standards.112 Barr v. Matteo113 and Howard v. Lyons114 both involved defama-
tion claims, and the Court treated the defenses—but not the underlying tort
claims—as grounded in federal law in rejecting the claims.  It reached a simi-
lar result in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, where petitioner unsuccessfully sought dam-
ages for a congressional staffer’s issuance of an allegedly unlawful
subpoena.115
Reinforcing the increased asymmetry between the availability of injunc-
tions and damages were officer damages immunities.  Immunity doctrine
reflects that countervailing interests, such as concerns for overdeterrence
and fairness to individual officers, may overcome the deterrent and compen-
satory purposes of damages relief.  The tradition of absolute immunity for
judges and legislators indicates that countervailing interests may totally
defeat claims for damages within certain categories of cases.116
V. EVALUATING BIVENS
Bivens involved trespassory injuries that could not be justified given con-
stitutional limitations similar to those in Scott v. Donald.  Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Bivens did not much advert to the Framers’ intent that the Consti-
tution be judicially enforceable, that trespass actions would be available to
enforce it, nor to precedent supporting such actions.  For some, those factors
might arguably sustain the Bivens decision even apart from arguments of
necessity.
109 327 U.S. 678, 679 (1946).
110 Id. at 684–85.
111 Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1947), discussed in Katz, supra note 71,
at 2.
112 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Gregory C. Sisk, Recovering the Tort Rem-
edy for Federal Official Wrongdoing, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1789, 1813 (2021) (approving the
exclusion of defamation claims from the Federal Tort Claims Act).
113 360 U.S. 564, 568, 574 (1959).
114 360 U.S. 593, 594, 597 (1959).
115 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963); id. at 650 (in reasoning that the claim itself was not fed-
eral, stating that “the facts alleged do not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
116 State and federal legislators are generally immune from injunctive relief as well.
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A. Necessity of a Damages Remedy in Bivens?
But this Essay also asks if (1) a damages remedy was constitutionally nec-
essary, and (2) whether the particular federal version of the remedy in Bivens
was statutorily authorized or constitutionally necessary.  First, was a damages
action a less necessary remedy (apart from its particular federal form) in Biv-
ens than in Scott?  As discussed above, the wider availability of injunctions for
ongoing and threatened violations, as well as the growth of individual officer
damages immunities, may have led jurists to see damages as a less insistent
remedy.  Indeed, the government’s argument in Bivens relied heavily on the
exclusionary rule117 to argue that a damages remedy was unnecessary.118
But accepting the importance of injunctive-type relief, including the
exclusionary rule, for promoting the rule of law does not mean that damages
remedies are never constitutionally required. Professors Fallon and Meltzer
famously said that a principle of “effective individual remediation” is not
unqualified, and may operate more as to some types of violations than
others.119  But “an overall structure of remedies [must be] adequate” to keep
government officials “generally within the bounds of law.”120  This systemic
framework may encompass some hard-edged requirements of damages reme-
dies in some types of cases, particularly for clear violations of certain constitu-
tional rights.121  For example, if the Fourth Amendment were enforced only
via the exclusionary rule without a possibility of damages for clear violations,
officials could engage in illegal searches and seizures so long as they did not
intend to prosecute the particular object of the search and seizure.122
B. Statutory Authorization and/or Constitutional Necessity of a Federal Damages
Remedy?
To say that a damages remedy is constitutionally necessary does not
require that remedy must take the form of a federal action (or an action
117 Brief for the Respondents at 24–25, 33, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 116900, at *24–25, *33;
see also id. at 40 (arguing that a remedy should be implied only if it is “absolutely neces-
sary”); id. at 24 (arguing that a remedy should not be implied “unless [it] is vital to protect
constitutional rights”).
118 See id. at 24.
119 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1789. R
120 Id. at 1790 & n.317.
121 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 984 (stating it is “fallacious to think that the availability R
of remedies . . . including the traditional tort remedies of damages and injunctions, is
always a matter of constitutional indifference”); id. at 988 (in applying Bivens, the Court
should acknowledge that “judge-crafted remedies for constitutional violations are not only
historically pedigreed, but sometimes constitutionally necessary to promote rule-of-law
values”).
122 Cf. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 492 (2020) (holding that damages were availa-
ble against individual federal officers as “appropriate relief” under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (2018), reasoning inter alia that damages
were “the only form of relief that can remedy some RFRA violations”).
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against the individual officer as opposed to the government).  Although no
Federal Tort Claims Act claim against the government was then available for
intentional torts, the existing baseline of remedies at the time of Bivens
included state-law tort actions as well as the exclusionary rule.123  And in
addition to arguing that the exclusionary rule provided a significant and per-
haps sufficient remedy, the government argued that “state law adequately
compensates the victim of an unlawful search or seizure for his injuries,”124
and devoted several pages in its brief to New York tort law.125  One could
therefore see the argument in Bivens as less about whether a damages rem-
edy might be constitutionally required, and more about whether the particu-
lar federal form of the action was appropriate.
1. Authorization in the 1875 Act Apart from Necessity?
As discussed above, the 1875 jurisdictional provision can be read as
authorizing federal jurisdiction over a trespass action with the constitutional
issue pleaded in the complaint.126 Bivens, like Scott, can be justified by this
reading.127  To be sure, Bivens differed from Scott in that the Court in Bivens
treated the action as derived from the Constitution as opposed to a common-
law action (whether general or state law) with a federal ingredient in the
complaint.  For some, the move to treating the action as derived from the
Fourth Amendment may be objectionable.  The duty not to trespass, they
might argue, does not take its origins directly from the Constitution but from
state law.  The Constitution generally limits government power rather than
creating freestanding judicially enforceable duties, and thus negates a
defense of justification rather than providing the source of the action.
It is possible, however, to argue that the Fourth Amendment creates tort-
like duties.128  What is more, there is no inherent illogic in restating the ele-
123 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 25, 33–34; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at
390 (“Respondents do not argue that petitioner should be entirely without remedy for an
unconstitutional invasion of his rights by federal agents.”); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“I do not understand either the Government or my dissenting
Brothers to maintain that Bivens’ contention that he is entitled to be free from the type of
official conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment depends on a decision by the State
in which he resides to accord him a remedy.”).
124 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 6 (summary of argument).
125 Id. at 35–38 (detailing New York tort law).  The government’s focus on the exclu-
sionary rule was grounded in the argument that damages remedies were generally ineffec-
tive at deterring unconstitutional behavior; see infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 81–83; cf. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens:
Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121–22 (2009) (arguing that
Congress has approved Bivens in subsequent legislation).
127 As noted supra note 82, the 1875 Act could be read as providing a broader grant of
common-law powers to the courts to confect constitutionally necessary and appropriate
remedies.
128 See Harrison, supra note 32, at 1021 (“The Fourth and Eighth Amendments, which R
after Bivens give rise to damages actions, are among the Constitution’s closest analogs to
the law of tort.”).
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ments of a Bivens claim as a duty not to trespass where the defendant lacks
legal justification due to constitutional constraints.129  Treating the lack of
constitutional power as central to the complaint, moreover, was already prev-
alent in injunctive suits,130 and it is doubtful that treating the actions as state-
law claims with a federal ingredient would have changed the overall result.131
Treating the actions as constitutionally based rather than as state-law based
thus would seem generally consistent with the argument that Congress
intended the 1875 Act to allow pleading an officer’s want of power in the
complaint.  And as noted above, Bivens skeptics are willing to allow for fed-
eral common law where specifically statutorily authorized, without a showing
of constitutional necessity.132
2. Constitutional Necessity of a Federal Bivens Action?
Putting aside the statutory argument, the question becomes whether the
particular federalized form of relief prescribed by the Court in Bivens—a fed-
eral cause of action under the Constitution—should be seen as necessary.
After all, to say that a damages remedy is constitutionally required does not
necessarily require that the action be treated as a federal constitutionally
based action.
It is noteworthy that the government, despite arguing in one section of
its brief that state remedies were adequate to compensate the plaintiff,133
also took the position that state-law remedies were ineffective as a general
matter, especially when it came to deterrence of misconduct.134  The plain-
tiffs also viewed state tort remedies as inadequate.135  Thus both the govern-
129 Nor is it odd for defenses to become elements of a claim as a matter of constitu-
tional necessity, as is true, for example, in public figure defamation claims.
130 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 936 (noting that Congress and the Court developed a R
scheme of constitutional remedies that differed from the scheme of liability for private
wrongs). See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Overcoming Sovereign Immu-
nity: Causes of Action for Enforcing the Constitution, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 165 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (discuss-
ing move from more common-law based to more constitutionally based claims).
131 The Westfall Act now precludes using a state-law action.  Federal Employees Liabil-
ity Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codi-
fied as amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b), (d) (2018)).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
133 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 38 (“Accordingly, had petitioner
brought his action in a New York court on the theories of trespass, false imprisonment,
battery, and mental distress, he would have had the benefit of a body of state law that
permits substantial recovery.”).
134 See id. at 26–28.  The government’s statement of its argument suggested that per-
haps it saw the damages remedy as inadequate for deterrence but adequate for compensa-
tion. See id. at 5–6. But cf. id. at 28 (discussing low recoveries in damages actions).  Or
perhaps the government was arguing that there were no legal deficiencies in New York law,
see supra note 125, even if plaintiffs faced many other obstacles to recovery.
135 See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 116899, at *11; Brief for the Respon-
dents, supra note 117, at 25, 32.
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ment and Bivens relied on the Court’s characterization of tort remedies as
futile in Mapp v. Ohio.136  Both parties also relied on various sources that had
concluded that existing tort remedies for Fourth Amendment violations were
ineffective, due to factors such as lack of sympathy for plaintiffs and the reluc-
tance of judges and juries to impose damages on law enforcement officers.137
The plaintiff argued that the futility of state tort remedies supported
implying a Fourth Amendment cause of action,138 while the government
argued that “[a]lthough state tort law may not effectively control police prac-
tices, a federal damage remedy would fare no better because the factors that
render state law ineffective would apply equally to a federal remedy.”139  The
Court should imply a remedy, argued the government, only where “abso-
lutely necessary.”140  It continued, “And when, as here, the remedy itself
would be ineffective as a deterrent device, and suffer the same difficulties as
136 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (characterizing state tort remedies for
the protection of privacy as “worthless and futile”), quoted in Brief for Petitioner, supra note
135, at 11; see also Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 25 (referring to the futility
of other remedies as a reason for the exclusionary rule in Mapp).
137 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 27–29.  The government brief
quoted in its text:
For one thing the average citizen is not willing to take the financial risk and
trouble attendant upon litigation.  Days may be lost from work, heavy expenses
may be incurred in an unsuccessful suit and the recovery may be quite small. . . .
Attorneys may discourage suits of this nature because they are unremunerative
and because of a belief that the judges are prejudiced in favor of police
officers . . . . (quoting Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 1182, 1209 (1952)).
Both parties cited, inter alia, an influential article by Caleb Foote.  See generally Caleb Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955) (contend-
ing generally that current tort remedies were inadequate but expressing some hope for
further developments under § 1983 and also arguing for other reforms), cited in Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 135, at 11 (citing Foote’s article for the proposition that the trespass
remedy had become “completely impotent”); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at
26, 29–30, 34 (arguing that problems Caleb Foote enumerated would be present in a
Fourth Amendment action).  Caleb Foote cited to factors such as jury reluctance to award
damages, limitations on damages, immunities, and evidentiary rules. See Foote, supra, at
500–06.  The government also suggested that the existing damages remedy under § 1983
was ineffective. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 26–27.
138 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 11.
139 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 5; see also id. at 26–27 (arguing that
“the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress unlawful searches by state police apparently has
been minimal” (footnote omitted)); cf. Bivens, 403 U.S at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“Private damage actions against individual police officers concededly have not adequately
met this requirement [for a workable remedy], and it would be fallacious to assume today’s
work of the Court in creating a remedy will really accomplish its stated objective.”).  Chief
Justice Burger’s dissent primarily recommended a legislative replacement of the exclusion-
ary rule. See id. at 411–24.
140 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 40.
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comparable existing remedies, there is no necessity.”141  Both parties, then,
argued that existing damages were less than efficacious.
One could nevertheless argue that the Bivens remedy was less necessary
than the federalized tort and injunctive actions in Scott.  The reason would be
that the tort actions against federal officials at the time of Bivens would uni-
versally be tried in federal courts, due to removal.  Thus, the parties would
not have to run the gauntlet of state court.  True, so long as the action were
styled as one of state law, the federal court might end up contending with
some state-law issues.142  But the lower federal courts could presumably
police state-law-based contractions of liability to assure consistency with con-
stitutionally necessary remedies,143 at least if the federal courts understood
that state-law-based claims were constitutionally required.144
Proponents of a broader view of federal common law might point out
that if the Bivens action was unnecessary because the federal courts could
infuse the state-law action with federal requirements, then preserving the
form of a state-law tort action would be a trivial homage to the federalism-
based default to state law.145  State law at the time of Bivens could still oper-
ate of its own force as to individual officer liability, but the room for its inde-
pendent operation was narrow.146  A cause of action for damages was
141 Id.
142 See Hill, supra note 21, at 1145 (stating that if “compensatory relief is an integral R
aspect of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures . . .
[then] there can be no plenary state control over significant incidents of the right, such as
the defense of privilege, measure of damages, and the like, notwithstanding the possible
allowance of some state rules as a matter of comity”); id. at 1155, 1160–61 (not necessarily
taking the position that damages were constitutionally required); id. at 1151, 1161 (not
necessarily taking the position that the action should be treated as a federal cause of
action, entitled to federal question jurisdiction); cf. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Reme-
dies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1972) (arguing that the
success of a state-law tort action would have largely depended on the vagaries of state law).
143 At the time, the federal courts in hearing suits against federal officers were still
working through whether the broad immunities in cases such as Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959), would be applicable in federal officer suits. See, e.g., Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d
129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965) (holding that such broad immunity did not apply with respect to
removed suit against postal inspectors involving a warrantless search and seizure).  The
parties briefed the immunity issue in Bivens, but the Court remanded rather than deciding
that issue. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398.
144 See infra text accompanying notes 159–160 (indicating that state law under the
FTCA, which now allows recovery against the United States for intentional torts, may still
deny damages even when they would be available under Bivens).
145 Cf. Bandes, supra note 87, at 336–37 (arguing that the Constitution should be
enforceable irrespective of congruence with state or common law); Fallon, supra note 23, R
at 981 (suggesting that basing liability on the Constitution rather than state law is prefera-
ble, and that the FTCA should be amended to allow suits against the federal government
for constitutional violations, and that such suits should not be based on state law); Katz,
supra note 71, at 55–58 (arguing against using state law as the basis for damages actions
against federal officials for constitutional violations).
146 See Hill, supra note 21, at 1127 (in discussing the Second Circuit decision in Bivens, R
observing that “even if rights against the officer for unconstitutional behavior are deemed
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constitutionally required in a case of trespassory harms like Bivens,147 and the
extent of allowable defenses was already federal.148  Given the constitutional
content of the action, a Bivens defender could say that the Court was not
stepping on congressional prerogatives by providing the remedy without
more explicit congressional authorization.  Nor was the allocation of jurisdic-
tion between state and federal courts changed given that the actions would
already be tried in federal court.149
In summary, the constitutional action in Bivens was supported by expec-
tations that the Constitution would provide law for courts to apply, that tres-
pass actions would be a form of action in which the Constitution would apply,
and that trespass actions were constitutionally necessary to address certain
constitutional violations.  The 1875 Judiciary Act supported treating such
claims as arising under federal law in both the injunction and damages set-
tings.  Nevertheless, a Bivens critic might still claim that implying a constitu-
tional action was unnecessary given that federal courts could assure that, in
administering the state-law action, constitutional requirements would have to
be met.
VI. OTHER ACTIONS
Some of the arguable justifications for Bivens even under a fairly strict
view of federal common law, however, do not necessarily carry over to the
wide variety of constitutional damages claims that litigants brought thereaf-
ter.  The availability of injunctive relief for nontrespassory harms does not
always carry a presumption of damages.  In addition, immunity-like concerns
could in some instances totally outweigh the need for a damages remedy—as
one sees in the traditional absolute damages immunities for judges, legisla-
tors, and prosecutors.150  And even where damages might presumptively be a
required remedy, a Bivens action may not be necessary in light of other reme-
to arise under state law in the sense in which that term is commonly used, the infusion of
federal law is very substantial, and severely limits the competence of the state”).
147 A remedy’s being constitutionally necessary does not necessarily mean the duty
must be federal, as is evident in the Parratt line of cases.  See supra text accompanying notes
69–70.  On the other hand, when the federal courts themselves enforce such constitution-
ally necessary remedies, they tend to federalize them.  That is, the implications in the Par-
ratt line are that if the state fails to provide remedies for certain intentional torts, a § 1983
action would be available.
148 Cf. Merrill, supra note 3, at 18 (stating that the federalism principle as a restraint on R
federal common law “is applicable only when federal law interferes with actual state
interests”).
149 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 75, at 513 (noting that recognizing a federal
cause of action does not increase the federal judicial workload, and the federal action is
“easier . . . to administer, and . . . could be tailored more closely to the policies underlying
the relevant constitutional provisions”).
150 See Fallon, supra note 23, at 964–65 (stating that such absolute immunity is R
equivalent to saying there is no cause of action).
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dies addressing wrongs of federal officers—remedies over which lower fed-
eral courts could exercise adequate supervision.151
In Davis v. Passman, for example, the Court implied a damages remedy
against a Congressman for sex discrimination in employment.152  The action
was not supported by historically available remedies,153 and the separation of
powers concerns animating legislative immunity arguably extended to con-
gressmen’s staffing decisions.154  Similarly in Schweiker v. Chilicky, where the
Court did not imply a Bivens action, there was little support in tradition or
constitutional necessity for a damages remedy for alleged procedural due
process violations in the adjudication of statutory claims for a government
benefit.155  And administrative remedies, in which there would be full com-
pensation for lost benefits with federal court review, were overall adequate to
supply procedural due process and keep officers in check.156
Other claims have at least stronger presumptive entitlements to damages
remedies under our analysis.  For example, Bivens actions for use of excessive
force by federal law enforcement and corrections officers would seem to sup-
ply necessary remedies, especially now that state-law remedies against the
officers as individuals are no longer available under the Westfall Act.157  The
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), however, possibly supplies sufficient reme-
dies against the United States in many settings, given its current inclusion of
intentional torts as to corrections and law enforcement officers.158  Indeed,
that inclusion arguably makes the Fourth Amendment suit in Bivens less nec-
essary today, although the federal courts in FTCA suits may allow for state
law159 and discretionary immunity defenses that are unavailable in Bivens
151 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (holding that civil service remedies
obviated the need for a Bivens claim for federal employees alleging retaliation for First
Amendment activity).
152 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
153 But cf. Fallon, supra note 23, at 966 (arguing that equal protection violations have R
strong claims to remediation).
154 Congress later extended statutory remedies for discrimination to congressional
employees. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, at 771 n.3. R
155 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
156 Id. at 429.
157 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), (d) (2018)).
158 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).  The Act was amended to add intentional torts in 1974. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, at 771. R
159 See, e.g., King v. United States, 917 F.3d 409, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) (indicating that the
district court had found recovery would be unavailable under Michigan qualified immunity
for government employee intentional torts, but factual issues existed precluding summary
judgment as to immunity defenses regarding the Fourth Amendment claims), rev’d sub
nom. Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 750 (2021) (holding that the district court’s dismis-
sal of the plaintiff’s FTCA claim was on the merits and could bar the plaintiff’s Bivens claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 2676); see also id. at 748 n.7 (“We express no view on the availability of
state-law immunities in this context.”).  The district court in King indicated that the Michi-
gan state law would require subjective bad faith to overcome qualified immunity in the
case. See King v. United States, No. 16-CV-343, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215640, at *41 (W.D.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL506.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-MAY-21 9:01
1920 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
actions.160  The claims in Hernández involved excessive force, and alternative
remedies were obscure at best.161  No FTCA action was available because the
injury occurred outside of the United States.  To be sure, the prospect of
opening up Bivens remedies as to injuries outside the United States as in
Hernández raises significant concerns.  But even a federal common-law skeptic
should have recognized the strength of a claim for a damages remedy in that
case before looking to whether special factors should foreclose the
remedy.162
CONCLUSION
This Essay has considered the propriety of the Bivens decision under a
fairly restrictive view of the propriety of federal common law.  We have
looked to whether the Framers of the Constitution and relevant statutes con-
templated the trespass action as a vehicle for enforcement of constitutional
prohibitions, whether the remedy is supported by common-law methodology
and precedent, whether the trespass remedy is constitutionally necessary, and
whether the federal form of the action is constitutionally necessary.  We have
argued that Bivens was supported by the Framers’ expectations that trespass
actions against officials would be a means of implementing the Constitution.
Common law and precedent also support the availability of a trespass action
and treating it as constitutionally necessary.  There is ample support, then,
for treating such an action for a constitutionally unjustifiable trespass as sup-
ported by Framers’ intentions, precedent, and constitutional necessity.
Of course, the question remains as to whether the action should be
treated as arising under federal law for purposes of the federal question juris-
dictional statute.  The 1875 federal question statute arguably authorized the
pleading of the constitutional issue in officer trespass cases as part of the
complaint, and such statutory authorization supports treating the action as
arising under federal law, quite apart from any issue of constitutional neces-
sity.  If, however, one requires necessity for recognition of a federally created
cause of action, there is an argument that necessity cannot be shown, given
Mich., Aug. 24, 2017); see also Kreines v. United States, 959 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1992)
(reasoning that the rejection of the plaintiff’s FTCA claims upon a finding of due care by
the officers was not inconsistent with finding liability under Bivens for a Fourth Amend-
ment violation); id. at 839 (“In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional
criteria for lawful conduct are distinct from those imposed by state tort law.”).
160 See, e.g., Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843 (2016) (FTCA claim was dis-
missed because discretionary immunity would bar the negligence claim for officers’ deci-
sion as to where to house an inmate who was beaten by another prisoner, but a Bivens
claim could go forward); see also Sisk, supra note 112, at 1828–32 (recommending revisions
to the FTCA to better remedy constitutional violations, and discussing problems with the
discretionary functions exception).
161 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 745 (2020) (discussing diplomatic efforts); id. at
748 (discussing that state-law actions against individual were unavailable due to the
Westfall Act, and that the FTCA excluded claims if the injuries occurred abroad).
162 Cf. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 126, at 121 (arguing that the Court should
presume that Bivens remedies are available before looking to special factors).
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that the Supreme Court, as a matter of federal constitutional law, could have
required state-law actions, and the federal courts would have heard such
actions against federal officers by removal.  But given that the underlying
trespass action is constitutionally necessary and would already have a federal
forum, it is difficult to say that Bivens itself significantly trenched on federal-
ism or separation of powers.
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